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Human Rights Clinic Documents
Human Rights Violations by the U.S.
Government Against Native Americans in
the Passage and Enforcement of Pub. L. No.
93-531*
INTRODUCTION
Pub. L. 93-531 is the U.S. law behind the forced removal of over
10,000 people from their homeland,' the largest relocation of an ethnic
group since the internment of the Japanese during World War 11.2 This
development examines the violations of international human rights law
against the traditional Native Americans affected by Pub. L. No. 93-531.
FACTS
Pub. L. No. 93-531 partitions land known as the "joint use area" be-
tween the Hopi and Navajo and mandates the removal, by force if neces-
sary, of Native Americans from lands they have inhabited for centuries
and consider their own.
In 1882, a section of northeastern Arizona was set aside "for the use
and occupancy of the [Hopi] and such other Indians. . ."I In 1942, Dis-
trict 6 was separated from the 1882 reservation and specifically reserved
*This piece was originally written as a brief to assist in the court challenge to Pub. L.
No. 93-531. The content and form have remained the same, but footnotes have been added.
The brief was prepared by the Big Mountain Project at the University of Denver's
Human Rights Clinic. This Clinic at the University of Denver selects certain contemporary
human rights cases or issues, which are in need of assistance and prepares briefs and
memorandum to be used by the attorneys directly involved in the cases. The Human Rights
Clinic of 1986 worked on three issues: indigenous rights, patterns of human rights violations
in Sri Lanka, and detentions and political repression in Chile.
The Big Mountain Project members were: Lucy Hawley, Todd Howland, Ved P. Nanda,
Judith Rhedin and Sandra Shwayder. The Project would like to thank Rich Garcia and
Barb Cashman for their assistance throughout the duration of the project, and to those
individuals and organizations that provided us with current information and resources.
1. Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal Government's Relocation of Navajo Indi-
ans Under P.L. 93-531 and P.L. 96-305, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 371 (1985).
2. Over 112,000 Japanese-Americans were temporarily "relocated" to "camps." See,
Blodgett, Justice at Last? 72 A.B.A.J. 24 (July 1, 1986).
3. Executive Order of President Arthur dated December 16, 1882, found in Healing v.
Jones, 210 F.Supp. 125, 129 (D.Ariz. 1962).
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for the Hopi, leaving the remainder to be shared among the Hopi and
other Indians living there.' In 1962, the U.S. in Healing v. Jones officially
recognized that both the Hopi and Navajo had shared this land for centu-
ries and designated the area a "joint use area."'
Pub. L. No. 93-531 requires that both Navajo and Hopi living on the
"wrong side" of the arbitrarily drawn partition be removed and relocated,
the majority to urban areas or to other land off the reservation.' In the
case of the Navajo, the number of people who are to be removed exceeds
10,000.7
Although Pub. L. No. 93-531 purports to set up guidelines to com-
pensate relocatees with lands and homes, but suitable lands have not in
fact been offered;8 nor is it possible to compensate traditional Native
Americans with substitutes when this land is of a unique nature, the focal
point of the religious, cultural, economic and psychological life of the Na-
tive Americans who occupy it. The result of relocation thus far has been
loss of a way of life. Denying these Native Americans access to what for
them is their spiritual center has resulted in suicides, alcoholism, and se-
vere depression, as well as loss of the homes provided them in compensa-
tion due to their difficulty in functioning effectively in a cash economy.
This has resulted in their loss of dignity which had come from self-suffi-
ciency and degradation due to welfare dependency.10 Anthropologists con-
tend that the traditional Native Americans are becoming extinct because
their cultures are dying in a process of assimilation.1 This process occurs
because U.S. lawmakers have failed to see that the laws they enact in fact
destroy the essential nexus between the traditional Native Americans' an-
cestral lands and their traditional ways of life. The result is the perma-
nent destruction of part of our own human heritage.
This case presents special difficulties because there are more than
two "sides" to the dispute, so the problem does not fit easily into the
legal categories attorneys and judges are accustomed to. Players in this
drama range from the "traditional" Indians to the "progressive" Indians,
as well as the non-Indian mining companies interested in the land's natu-
ral resources. Therefore, a just and workable remedy requires an appreci-
ation of the traditional Native American culture and a willingness to go
beyond the traditional framework of our domestic law. 2
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-531 (1974).
7. Whitson, supra note 1.
8. J. KAMMER, THE SECOND LONG WALK (1980). See also Farrell, The New Indian
Wars, Denver Post, Nov. 20, 1983, at 11, col. 2.
9. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, CONTINUITIES OF HoPI CULTURE CHANCE (1978).
10. T. SCUDDER, No PLACE TO Go (1982).
11. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
12. See the "Brandeis Brief" in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See also, Bikle,
Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legis-
lative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924).
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The effect of Pub. L. 93-531 must be interpreted in light of the inter-
nationally required minimum standards for the protection of human
rights." The current violations of the Native Americans' human rights
have resulted in part from mistaken justifications arising from past
abuses. In 1934, the United States government unilaterally acted to
change the system of governance that had previously existed in Indian
tribes. 4 Some tribes accepted the new form of government; others did
not."6 For most tribes, including the Hopi and Navajo, the result has been
a form of dual authority: the traditional Indian form of leadership is ac-
cepted by some members of the tribe, while the Indian Tribal Council is
accepted by others.'6 The U.S. government, in recognizing only the Tribal
Councils, denies traditional Indians participation in critical decisions that
have an impact on their lives in devastating ways.
Although the validity of the Tribal Councils is not at issue here, this
denial of participation to traditional Indians in the passage of the law, as
well as the enforcement of the law, are violative of international mini-
mum standards set for the protection of human rights. These and other
human rights violations are enumerated and analyzed in arguments 1-7
below. Each of the arguments can be applied in domestic U.S. courts as
violations of the traditionalists internationally guaranteed human
rights.'7
13. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
14. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §467 et. seq. [hereinafter cited as
I.R.A.].
15. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. International law is a body of law which is binding upon all nations. It is derived
from two major sources: conventional law and customary international law. See, Bilder, An
Overview of International Human Rights Law, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE, (H. Hannum ed. 1984). These laws set out the minimum standards of behavior for
activities between States (e.g. extradition), and between States and citizens (e.g. human
rights). Evolving rules of international law, called "developing international law," are laws
which have yet to be accepted in state practice as binding customary international law, but
which nonetheless have an aspirational character attributed to them by those states which
do not consider the rules binding.
The United States Constitution states that treaties made under the authority of the
United States are the supreme law of the land. U.S. courts have applied international
human rights law in three ways: directly, through the application of conventions; through
the recognition of customary international law; and in conjunction with domestic law for
interpretive guidance of domestic laws. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing
International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 223
(H. Hannum 1984).
Courts have consistently applied international human rights law as evidenced by inter-
national custom. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court held that "deliberate tor-
ture. . .violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights." Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). The court in Filartiga. referred to the
following international legal instruments: the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, as well as other international conven-
tions and national laws, judicial opinions, and writings of publicists. International human
rights law was also applied in Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980),
1987
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Point 1: Indigenous Peoples are a Specially Protected Group under In-
ternational Law. Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates Internationally Protected
Indigenous Rights.
All law in this area must be considered developing international law.
The international community has begun to recognize the special problems
of the protection of the rights Indigenous populations as well as to appre-
ciate the effort necessary to maintain respect for these rights.
The 1957 International Labor Organization Convention 107, Con-
cerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries [hereinafter ILO Convention] in
Article 4 states: "In applying the provisions of this Convention relating to
the integration of populations concerned: a) due account shall be taken of
the cultural and religious values. . . existing among these popula-
tions. . .; b) the danger involved in disrupting the values and institutions
of the said populations unless they can be replaced by appropriate struc-
tures. . . shall be recognized.""8
and in von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., the court awarded injunctive relief and damages for the viola-
tion of customary international law. In the von Dardel case, which concerned the disappear-
ance of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, the court stated that "proof of a tort in
violation of international law as that law is currently understood establishes both a cause of
action and jurisdiction in the District Court." von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 256
(D.D.C. 1985). It is a long-standing principle that international law is used to shape the
content and reach of constitutional and statutory standards. In Murray v. Schooner Charm-
ing Betsy, the court held that "an Act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
International human rights instruments have been used to interpret and widen consti-
tutional and statutory standards in many cases. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650,
673 (1948)(Black, J., & Douglas, J., concurring) (Murphy,J. & Rutledge, J., concurring);
Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 604, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949); Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub noma. Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1981); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D.Conn.
1980).
Although there is no specific precedent for determining the outcome or status of inter-
national law when there is an inconsistency between it and pre-existing U.S. law or agree-
ments, the Reporters of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
state that:
Since international customary law and an international agreement have equal
authority in international law (section 102, comment j) and both are law of the
United States (section 131), arguably later customary law should be given ef-
fect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or
agreement.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) §135 Re-
porters' note 4, at 83 (Tent. Draft No. 6, April 12, 1985).
International law guarantees that each individual and each individual group member is enti-
tled to basic protections, regardless of whether their government recognizes those rights.
These protections hold even if the majority has decided that other values are more impor-
tant; there is no balancing human rights with other values. The traditional Native Ameri-
cans are entitled to their basic human rights as outlined below.
18. 1957 International Labor Organization Convention 107, Concerning the Protection
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal Populations in Independent Countries,
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Article 2 of the ILO Convention expressly prohibits: a) "trespass
upon human dignity and individual initiative" and b) "recourse to force
or coercion and the use of measures tending towards their artificial
assimilation." 9
The purpose of Pub. L. No. 93-531 is not necessarily the integration
of Native American relocatees, their forced assimilation into the domi-
nant culture is in fact the result. Furthermore, having their traditional
primary means of livelihood taken from them by the relocation, reduces
them to welfare dependency which degrades a once self-sufficient peo-
ple. o Their culture and religious values are disregarded and devastated
by the forced move into more urban surroundings.2 This is in violation of
the provisions of Article 7 of the ILO Convention which states: "In defin-
ing the rights and duties of the populations concerned regard shall be had
to their customary laws. . .Indigenous populations shall be allowed the
retention of their own customs and institutions. .. 22
International law recognizes the special relationship that traditional
Native Americans have with the land they have inhabited for centuries.
The World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination Ar-
ticle 2(a) (pertaining specifically to Indigenous peoples) declares:
The Conference endorses the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain
their traditional structure of economy and culture including their own
language and also recognizes the special relationship of indigenous
peoples to their land, and stresses that their land, land rights and nat-
ural resources should not be taken away from them.2 3
International law specifically prohibits the forced relocation of indig-
enous populations. Article 12(2) of the ILO Convention states: "When in
such cases removal of these populations is necessary as an exceptional
measure they shall be provided with lands of quality at least equal to
that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for
their present needs and future development." (emphasis added).2 4
Pub. L. No. 96-305, passed as an amendment to Pub. L. No. 93-531,
reduces the amount of surface land owned by both Navajo and Hopi.2
The law orders that Navajo be removed from 911,000 acres of land but
provides only 400,000 acres as compensation, only 250,000 of which has
opened for signature, June 26, 1957 ,328 U.N.T.S. 247 (1957). [Hereinafter cited as ILO
Convention].
19. Id.
20. See generally J. REDHOUSE, GEOPOLITICS OF THE NAVAJO-HoPi LAND DISPUTE (1985).
21. Sills, Relocation Reconsidered: Competing Explanations of the Navajo-Hopi Land
Settlement Act of 1974, 14(3) J. ETHNIC STUD. 53, 56 (1986).
22. ILO Convention, supra note 17.
23. G.A. Res. 17:260, Jan. 1978, Res. 3157(XXVIII).
24. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
25. Pub. L. No. 93-531 (1974); (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. Secs. 640-640d-28
(1982)).
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actually been awarded the Navajo (after eight years of negotiations).2"
Under the law, the Hopi lose the right to use the surface of over a half
million acres." Quantity considerations aside, the Big Mountain area of
the Joint Use Area has unique qualities that cannot be equaled as it is
unique for its inhabitants.
The Declaration of Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
articles 8 and 4 state:
No State shall participate financially or militarily in the involuntary
displacement of indigenous populations, or in the subsequent eco-
nomic exploitation or military use of their territory.
Indigenous nations and peoples are entitled to the permanent control
and enjoyment of their aboriginal ancestral-historical territories. This
includes surface and sub-surface rights, in land and coastal waters,
renewable and non-renewable resources, and the economies based on
these resources.28
Point 2: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates the Native Americans Right to their
Traditional Culture.
The right to observe one's culture is well-established in both conven-
tional and customary international law. Article 1(1) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right
to all people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."2 9
In the Declaration of Barbados II, the concept of cultural domina-
tion, where governmental policies, foreign education and mass media pre-
sent Western culture as the only "civilized" culture was condemned. 0
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights article 27
further states: "persons. . .shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. '31
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborates on this right
to culture, stating:
Article 16(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and state.
26. Big Mountain Notes, at 5, col. 1 (Summ. 1986).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-531, supra note 25.
28. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/WP.4/Add.4.
29. U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
30. Declaration of Barbados 1I cited in J.R. Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, STUDY OF THE PROB-
LEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS Vol. I, at 237. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/
7 [hereinafter cited as Cobo Report].
31. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974). For a guarantee of one's
right to culture that explicitly mentions Indigenous people see: The World Conference to
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination article 2(a), G.A. Res. 17:260, Jan. 1978, Res.
3157 (XXVIII).
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Article 26(3) Parents have the prior right to choose the kind of educa-
tion that shall be given their children.
Article 27(1) Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cul-
tural life of the community. .. 3
These diverse rights, all of which fall under the rubric of "culture"
are violated by the relocation in several ways. The extended family units
(rather than merely nuclear family units) are not relocated together to
environments similar to the land they have previously occupied.3 3 The
education of the traditional Navajo children includes education in the
sheep herding culture and religious ceremonies that can only be pursued
in the unique environment of the homeland.3 The cultural life of the
traditional Native Americans is dependent on the land and natural reli-
gious centers located thereon.3 5
Further, the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsstates in more
general terms in article 22 that:
Everyone as a member of society, has the right to social security and
is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation, and in accordance with the organization and resources of
each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality. 6
By rendering the conduct of traditional Native American culture, society
and economy extremely difficult or impossible to pursue, the broad rights
articulated above are totally denied.
Point 3: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Prevents Traditional Native Americans from
Practicing and Continuing their Religion in Violation of International
Law.
Traditional Native American religious practices are tied to the land,
both in terms of nature and specific geographical areas. Pub. L. No. 93-
531 puts a barrier between the traditional Native Americans and their
natural religious centers.
The United Nations Charter article 55(c) pledges members to cooper-
ate in the achievement of: "universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, language or religion."3 "
Other international legal documents set out more specific norms. The
American Convention on Human Rights article 12(2) states: "No one
shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to main-
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
33. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
37. U.N. CHARTER (1945).
1987
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tain. . .his religion ... 38
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination article 5(d) reaffirms the oft-stated right to "freedom
of thought, conscience and religion." 9
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights article
18(2) states: "No one shall be subject to coercion which impairs his free-
dom to have ... a religion or belief of his choice." Article 27 further
states: "persons. . .shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.
40
A recent significant development is the adoption in 1981 of the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimi-
nation Based on Religion or Belief.4 ' This declaration was part of the
ongoing efforts of the United Nations since its inception to provide con-
crete content for the U.N. Charter's prescription of "human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion. 4
2
Article 1(1) and article 4(2) of the Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
state:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have religion or whatever
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
All states shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where
necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appro-
priate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or
other beliefs in this matter.4
Based upon the plain language of the Declaration and its preparatory
work the conclusion is inescapable that the Declaration extends to theis-
tic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.
Many of those Indians involved in the Tribal Councils who have cre-
ated the perceived need for Pub. L. No. 93-531 have given up their tradi-
tional religion and beliefs." Developing international law protects those
traditional Native Americans from both those inside and outside the tribe
38. American Convention on Human Rights 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M.
352 (1966).
39. Id.
40. U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
41. U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, adopted, Jan. 18, 1982, G.A. Res. 55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.51) at
171, U.N. Doc. A/Res./36/55 (1982).
42. U.N. CHARTER (1945).
43. G.A. Res. 36/55 (1981).
44. Sills, supra note 21.
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who are attempting to impose a different religion upon them.4 The im-
plementation of Pub. L. No. 93-531 does not negatively impact every Na-
tive American's right to religion. Only the traditional Native Americans
are affected, but that effect is devastating and constitutes a violation of
their internationally protected human rights.
Point 4: The Lack of Participation by Traditional Native Americans in
the Formulation of Pub. L. No. 93-531 is a Violation of Their Protected
Rights to Political Participation.
Traditionally, Native Americans have made decisions by consensus.
Following the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,4s representative democ-
racy was introduced into Indian Tribes. Some Indians accepted the new
method, others boycotted it.4 Traditional Native Americans continue to
boycott the elections in protest of the imposed form of governance."8 To-
day "representatives" control a vast amount of power, but have not de-
rived that power from the people that are most affected by their
decisions.49
International law does not mandate one form of political participa-
tion (e.g. U.S. style elections) at the expense of another, but does man-
date that every individual participate in the decisions that affect them.
Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of
government."0
Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights guarantees the right to all people to "freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."'"
The passage of PL 93-531 is an example of mandated lack of partici-
pation by the traditional Native Americans in the decisions made by the
Tribal Council that adversely affect the traditionals. Article 2 of the ILO
Convention states: "The right of ownership, collective or individual, of
the members of the populations concerned over the lands which these
populations traditionally occupy shall be recognized.52 This protection
should be taken into consideration along with article 13(2) of the ILO
Convention which states: "Arrangements shall be made to prevent per-
sons who are not members of populations concerned from taking advan-
45. See the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, reprinted in 3 ALTERNA-
TIVES 280 (1977).
46. I.R.A., supra note 14.
47. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
51. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
52. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
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tage of these customs or lack of understanding of the laws on the part of
members of these populations to secure ownership or use of the lands
belonging to such members."5
It is essential to recognize that traditional Native Americans have a
customary relationship to their land which effectively governs their use of
the land that is not commensurate with the Western conception of prop-
erty. By imposing legal restrictions on ownership along with governmen-
tal procedures and structures (i.e., "elected" representatives among a peo-
ple who govern themselves by consensus) which traditional Indigenous
people also could not clearly understand, the U.S. government violated
article 13(2) of the ILO Convention, thereby rendering any expressed rec-
ognition in accordance with article 2 of the ILO Convention virtually
meaningless.
Article 7 of the ILO Convention addresses this issue as follows: "In
defining the rights and duties of the populations concerned regard shall
be had to their customary laws."54 The traditional Native Americans do
not govern themselves according to the rule of the majority.5 As a result,
the majority of them did not participate in elections of representatives. 6
In negotiating for their land with "elected" representatives rather than
the traditional elders of the tribes involved, the U.S. violated article 7 of
the ILO Convention.
Point 5: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Forces Economically Self-Sufficient Native
Americans into a Position of Economic Dependence in Violation of In-
ternational Law.
Since the first European settlers came into contact with the Native
Americans in the U.S., the latter's self-sufficient economy has been ad-
versely affected by the introduction of an exchange economy. 7 The self-
sufficiency of the Native Americans has been continuously undermined by
laws affecting the disposition of their property."' Pub. L. No. 93-531 and
its amendment Pub. L. No. 96-305 mandate the removal of the traditional
Native Americans from their source of self-sufficiency: their land.5 9 Pub.
L. No. 96-305 severely limits the size of the traditional peoples livestock
herds, thus, undermining their means to self-sufficiency.6
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. R. CLEMMER-SMITH, supra note 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. E.g., V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMER-
ICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984).
59. Pub. L. No. 93-531 removes the traditional Native Americans from the land they
have historically inhabited, and Pub. L. No. 96-305 almost completely eliminates the possi-
bility of self-sufficiency for those who our allowed to stay on the land they have historically
inhabited.
60. Pub. L. No. 93-531, supra note 25.
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International law recognizes the right of the traditional Native Amer-
icans to choose the type of economic system in which they will partici-
pate. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples
states: "Every people has the right to choose its own economic and social
system and pursue its own path to economic development freely and
without foreign interference.""1
The traditional Native Americans right to control their resources is
recognized by international law. Article 1(1) of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right to all
people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." Article 1(2) further states
unequivocally: "In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence. '"62
Point 6: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Completely Eliminates the Ability of the
Affected Traditional Native Americans to Implement their Right to
Development.
Point 6, like point 1 is based on developing international law. The
right to development can be inferred from existing customary interna-
tional law as the following United Nation's document indicates:
The right to development stands for the development of human be-
ings and not for the development of countries, the production of
things, their distribution, within social systems or the transformation
of social structures. These may be means towards the end but they
should not be confused with the end, which is that of developing the
entire human being and human beings.6"
The right to development allows different views of development to
exist simultaneously. 4 Pub. L. No. 93-531 severely impedes the chances
61. Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, supra note 45.
62. See supra note 29.
63. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND
TEcHNOLOGY-ToWARDS A TECHNOLOGY FOR SELF-RELIANCE, 3 (1979). In a 1979 Report of the
Secretary General concerning the international dimensions of the right to development as a
human right, various legal sources were supplied as bases of the right to development. Seven
elements were articulated in this document:
(i) The realization of the potentialities of the human person in harmony with the commu-
nity should be seen as the central purpose of development.
(ii) The human person should be regarded as the subject and not the object of the develop-
ment process.
(iii) Development requires the satisfaction of both material and nonmaterial basic needs.
(iv) Respect for human rights is fundamental to the development process.
(v) The human person must be able to participate fully in shaping his own reality.
(vi) Respect for the principles of equality and nondiscrimination is essential.
(vii) The achievement of a degree of individual and collective self-reliance must be an inte-
gral part of the process.
Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979).
64. Nanda, Development as an Emerging Human Right Under International Law, 13
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 161 (1984). See also, Schachter, The Evolving International Law
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of the traditional Native Americans to develop as they define the term.
Offering monetary compensation and modern homes to satisfy the relo-
catees does not meet the international standard for development.
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples states:
"Every people has the right to choose its own economic and social system
and pursue its own path to economic development freely and without for-
eign interference." 5 The right to development insures that the people
most affected by a decision, have a role in making the decision."6
Point 7: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates the Traditional Native American's
Right to Live in One's Homeland.
The right to live in one's homeland is a basic need which has been recog-
nized by all civilized nations and is expressly guaranteed in several inter-
national instruments to which the U.S. has been a signatory. 7 The Amer-
ican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, article 8 provides:
"Every person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of a
State of which he is a national, to move freely within such territory, and
not leave it except by his own will." (emphasis added).6 s
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 13(2) states: "Ev-
eryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to re-
turn to his country."6 9 The final report made to the Subcommission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities addressed
the problem of discrimination and indigenous populations. Some of these
points are relevant to the Big Mountain dilemma:
513. Indigenous peoples have a natural and inalienable right to keep
the territories they possess and to claim the lands which have been
taken from them. In other words, they are entitled to the natural and
cultural patrimony contained in the territory and to determine freely
how to use it and how to benefit from it.
514. Recognition must be given to the right of all indigenous nations
or peoples, as a minimum, to the return and control of sufficient and
suitable land to enable them to live an economically existence in ac-
cordance with their own customs and traditions, and to develop fully
at their own pace. All possible efforts should be made to ensure that
State governments give legal recognition to the indigenous people's
right to land. States that do not have indigenous land rights legisla-
of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976); Rich, The Right to Development as
an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983).
65. Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, supra note 45.
66. This is especially important given the lack of political participation of the tradi-
tional Native Americans, as outlined in point 4, supra.
67. See e.g. OAS/Ser L/VI 11.66, Doc 17, Sept. 27, 1985.
68. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the 9th Int'l
Conference of American States, Bogota (1948) reprinted in Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, OAS, HANDBOOK ON EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 48-74
(OEA/Ser L/V/11-23, Doc. 21, rev. 6, 1979).
69. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
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tion should review their policies towards indigenous people and make
an early commitment to enacting such legislation.
519. Ownership of indigenous land by the respective indigenous popu-
lations should be immediately recognized by all States ...
525. Legal measures should be taken guaranteeing the indigenous
populations more comprehensive protection in the possession and ef-
fective control of their territories.
7 0
Forcibly removing Native Americans from their ancestral homeland
is a violation of international law. The International Labor Organization
Convention article 12(2) states: "When in such cases removal of these
populations is necessary as an exceptional measure they shall be provided
with lands of quality at least equal to that of the lands previously occu-
pied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future
development."7
Point 8: Pub. L. No. 93-531 and Pub. L. No. 9-305 Violate the Right of
the Traditional Native Americans to Own Property as a Group and the
their Freedom from Arbitrary Deprivation of Communal Property.
Collective ownership of land by Native Americans has been accorded
lower status by the U.S. Congress and courts than individually-owned
land which would be entitled to Fifth Amendment protection under the
U.S. Constitution.7 2
Specifically, under Pub. L. No. 93-531 both the Navajo and Hopi are
deprived of their right to collective ownership. This violates article 17(1)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: "Everyone
has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others. '73 Further, Point 2 of Article 1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out
of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be de-
prived of its own means of subsistence.
74
Article 2 of the ILO Convention is even more explicit on this point:
"The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the
populations concerned over the lands which these populations tradition-
ally occupy shall be recognized.""
70. Cobo Report, supra note 30, at 68-70.
71. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
72. See Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights:
A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 15 (1982).
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
74. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.Doc. A/6546.
75. ILO Convention, supra note 18.
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Point 9: Pub. L. No. 93-531 Violates the Traditional Native American's
Right under International Law to be Treated Equally to other Ethnic
Groups when Faced with Similar Circumstances.
When faced with a similar situation involving settlers who had en-
croached upon Indian lands, Congress allowed the settlers to pay for the
land rather than forcibly removing the settlers. Thus, the passage of Pub.
L. No. 93-531 constitutes unequal treatment of Navajo and Hopi peoples
from similarly situated settlers.7"
The United Nations Charter article 55(c) pledges members to cooper-
ate in the achievement of "universal respect for and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, language or religion."
'7
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Ev-
eryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion without distinction of any kind such as race. .. '"s These points are
also enumerated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Articles 26 and 27 provide:
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled with-
out any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this re-
spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 27. In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic mi-
norities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or
to use their own language."9
International law mandates that any practice that discriminates on
the basis of ethnic origin must be overturned. The International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination articles
II(c) and (d) states:
Each State party shall take effective measures to review governmen-
tal, national and local policies and to amend, rescind or nullify any
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetrating
racial discrimination wherever it exists.
Each State party shall prohibit and bring to an end by all appropriate
means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial
discrimination...8s
76. See, e.g., In the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act, Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636,
and again in the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Pub. L. No. 92-203.
77. U. N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32.
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 31.
80. U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
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The International Convention on Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid article 2(b) prohibits: "deliberate imposition on a ra-
cial group or groups living conditions calculated to cause its or their phys-
ical destruction in whole or in part."'" Given the long history of interac-
tion between the traditional Native Americans and the U.S. government,
a correlation can be drawn which indicates that the decline in numbers of
traditional Native Americans relates to U.S. governmental policies.82 The
ramifications of Pub. L. No. 93-531 on traditional Native Americans will
exacerbate the situation. Congress passed the bill without full compre-
hension of the ramifications and consequently international law has been
violated.
CONCLUSION
In light of the inevitable cross-cultural misunderstandings between a
modern, technological society on the one hand and an indigenous culture
predicated on a spiritual relationship to the means of survival and devel-
opment on the other, there are bound to be arguments against the allega-
tions of international law violations cited above that may sound plausible
within the context of our contemporary societal perceptions and values.
The special challenge to the Court in this case is in understanding the
values and needs of. a people that have no easy translation in our own
society.
Terms such as "development" and "property" and even "ownership"
are normatively ambiguous and create difficulties of precise analysis. In-
ternational law has been created with contributions from various cultures
and, therefore, is of assistance in overcoming this obstacle to justice. The
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, for example, con-
sistently equates spiritual development with material development as an
essential goal of International Human Rights.83 Nowhere is spiritual de-
velopment subordinated to material development in the articles drafted
for the protection of the right to development. Yet, the spiritual develop-
ment, as well as the traditional economy, of the Native Americans is ef-
fectively cut off by relocation and submersion in the dominant culture.
And when economic development is rooted in spiritual relationship with
the source of material supplies (i.e., food, materials for clothing and hous-
ing), both subsistence and religious activity are dictated by natural phe-
nomena. This is a very different but equally worthwhile kind of economic
development. By relegating Native American's traditional economy to
history rather than being allowed to continue and thrive, offering them
economic options within our market economy is nothing more than an
Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 35, U.N.Doc. A/5603.
81. G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
82. See generally NATIONAL LAWYER'S GUILD, COMMITTEE ON NATIVE AMERICAN STRUG-
GLES, RETHINKING INDIAN LAW (1982).
83. Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/1.4(1963), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 133 (Supp. 1949).
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empty gesture.
It is difficult for U.S. law makers who conceive of land as "real es-
tate" or "property" to truly understand the relationship of the traditional
Native Americans to their homeland. Their relationship is custodial
rather than one of ownership and land is not "property" but spirit, the
place from which they came and to which they will return. It cannot be
sold or exploited for its resources. The land gives life and in return they
protect the life of the land: this is their sacred obligation, which they
abandon at their spiritual, psychological and physical peril (as the results
of relocation indicate). In recognition of the rights of the assimilated
Hopi and Navajo who prefer to abandon the old ways and adopt the new
(as is their right) there is always the solution of monetary compensation.
The land is unique. Monetary compensation, on the other hand, deals
with the easy universal of the dollar and would cost no more than the
escalating costs of compliance with Pub. L. No. 93-531 by the U.S.
government.
In view of these considerations, we recommend that the court declare
Pub. L. No. 93-531 and Pub. L. No. 96-305 unconstitutional due to inter-
national human rights violations, and order the cessation of all forced re-
location efforts and allow those relocatees currently living away from
their homes to return.
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